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THE PENNSYLVANIA
TAKEOVER DISCLOSURE LAW:
A STATUTE WAITING TO BE INVALIDATED
IRA P. TIGERf
I. INTRODUCTION
N THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS, THE CASH TENDER OFFER
has become an increasingly utilized mechanism for gaining control of
a corporation that resists acquisition.' The individual, company, or
group wishing to take over a corporation (tender offeror) simply
makes an offer to purchase a quantity of securities of the target com-
pany from its shareholders. 2 If and when the offeror obtains enough
shares to give him effective voting power, he can take over control,
and, if he desires, replace incumbent management with his own
people.3 By dealing directly with shareholders of a publicly held
corporation and circumventing incumbent management, the tender
offeror is able to obtain control of the corporation quickly, without a
bitter proxy contest and without making any commitments to incum-
bent management. It has been observed that "[c]ash tender offers,
combining speed and secrecy, have proven very efficient: the rate of
success is high, the cost and risk are low. From 1972 to 1975, 82% of
all cash tender offers were either successful ... or partially success-
ful." This high rate of success was, however, shortlived. In 1976
and 1977 the success rate dropped to little better than one half.5
One explanation for declining victories among tender offerors was that
f Partner, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. B.S., Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, 1956; J. D., University of Pennsylvania, 1959. Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
1. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977); Kramer, Budnick & Hope,
Tender Offers: Background and Definition, in TENDER OFFERS: MAKING AND MEETING THEM 9
(C. Kanter ed. 1979). As early as 1966, "the increased use of cash tender offers to acquire
control of corporations was evidenced by the fact that in [that year] there were over 100 such
offers involving companies with securities listed on national securities exchanges as compared
with eight in 1960." S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967). A more recent study has
indicated that this trend has continued, for during the 1973-1977 period, "89.5 percent of all
tender offers (465) were cash tender offers." Austin, Study Reveals Trends in Tactics, Premiums,
Success Rates in Offers, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1978, at 34, col. 1.
2. See generally Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U.
PA. L. REv. 317, 317-21 (1967); Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1250, 1251-54 (1973).
3. See generally authorities cited note 2 supra.
4. Note, The Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes: A Response to Great Western,
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"target management, through the use of improved defensive tactics
and aided by state takeover statutes, [became] better able to resist
unwanted takeovers."
6
Prior to 1968, cash tender offers were virtually unregulated. 7 In
that year, however, two very significant events occurred. In March,
1968, Virginia enacted the first state tender offer statute. 8 In July of
that same year, Congress enacted the Williams Act 9 requiring tender
offerors to file certain information with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). A flurry of state activity followed, eventually re-
sulting in the enactment of takeover statutes in some thirty-six
states, including Pennsylvania.' 0 The avowed purpose of these statutes,
which contain both procedural and substantive requirements, is to
6. Id.
7. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 64-67,
153-54 (1973); H. BLOOMENTHAL, 1979 SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 135 (1979).
8. VA. CODE § 13.1-528 to -541 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1979).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)-(4), 78n(d)-(f) (1976).
10. See Note, Securities Law and the Constitution: State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsid-
ered. 88 YALE L.J. 510, 514-15 n.29 (1979). See also Katcher, State Statute Considerations, in
TENDER OFFERS: MAKING AND MEETING THEM 137, 141 (C. Kanter ed. 1979). The only states
which presently do not have takeover laws are Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Montana,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
After the Virginia Act, see note 8 and accompanying text supra, the state
takeover statutes were enacted in the following order: in 1969, NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 78.376 -. 3778 (1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1978); in 1972, WIS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01-25 (West Supp. 1979); in 1973, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01-.13 (West
Supp. 1979); in 1974, HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to -15 (1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-
1276 to -1283 (West Supp. 1979); in 1975, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-51.5-101 to -108 (Supp.
1979); IDAHO CODE.§§ 30-1501 to -1513 (Supp. 1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§
47-32-1 to -47 (Supp. 1979); in 1976, ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.57.010-.120 (Supp. 1979);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-456 to -468 (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203
(Supp. 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 292.560-991 (Supp. 1978); MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN.
§§ 11-901 to -908 (Michie Supp. 1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 110C, §§ 1-13 (Law. Co-op Supp.
1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 451.901-.917 (West Supp. 1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW. §§
1600-1613 (McKinney Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1979);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-2101 to -2114 (Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-1 to -13 (1978);
in 1977, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1264 to -1264.14 (Supp. 1977); Florida Investor Protection Act,
ch. 77-441, §§ 1-8, 1977 Fla. Laws 1804 (repealed 1979); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1901 to -1915
(1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 801-817 (West Supp. 1979); MISS. CODE ANN. §§
75-72-1 to -23 (Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2401 to -2417 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 421-A:1-:15 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to -19 (West Supp. 1978); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-1 to -11 (Supp. 1977); in 1978, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211, § 137.51-.70
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 502.211-215 (West Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 409.500-.565 (Vernon 1978); S.C. CODE §§ 35-2-10 to -110 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1979);
in 1979, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-3.1-1 to -11 (Burns Supp. 1979); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 51:1500-
:1512 (West Supp. 1979).
For a discussion of the Idaho takeover statute, which was held to be preempted by the
Williams Act in Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds sub nora. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979), see
notes 23-28, 78-84 & 179-87 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the now-repealed
Florida law, see notes 119-32 and accompanying text infra.
2
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provide information and protection to shareholders of the target com-
pany.11
State takeover statutes generally require one who intends to
make a tender offer for the shares of a target company 1) to make an
advance disclosure of his intention to a state administrative agency
and to the target company itself, 2) to file a detailed report with the
state administrator concerning his background, intentions, and other
information, and 3) to delay making the tender offer until a specified
period of time has elapsed.' 2  In addition, the state administrator
typically is given the power to postpone the effective date of the ten-
der offer and (on his own initiative or at the behest of the target
company's management) to hold a hearing inquiring into the ade-
quacy of the disclosure and other matters.
13
The jurisdictional scope of a state takeover statute generally is
based upon the relationships existing between the target corporation
and the state, despite the fact that these statutes impose duties prin-
cipally upon the offeror. 14 The reach of these statutes is pervasive
since the statutes rest jurisdiction on the existence of state-
corporation relationships certain to encompass a multitude of corpo-
rate entities.' 5  For the most part, state takeover statutes cover cor-
porations which are either incorporated under the laws of the state or
have their principal place of business in the state, and the statutes
emphasize the need for protection of shareholders of those target
11. See Note, supra note 10, at 515; see, e.g., VA. CODE § 13.1-528(B)
(Michie 1978 & Supp. 1979). The Virginia Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act states that "[t]he
purpose of this chapter is to protect the interests of offerees, investors and the public by
requiring that an offeror make fair, full and effective disclosure to offerees of all information
material to a decision to accept or reject a take-over bid." Id. But see H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra
note 7, at 141; Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of Tender Offers, in THE TEN-
DER OFFER 41, 42 (C. Kanter ed. 1972). State takeover statutes were
apparently inspired by the legislature's concern for the issuer rather than the investor. A
number of states apparently feared that established local concerns might, through the
tender offer device, be taken over by outside interests who would then close down plants
and leave local residents jobless. These legislatures considered bills which would have
effectively precluded tender offers for companies located within their states.
Id. at 42 (footnote omitted).
12. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-3.1-1 to
-11 (Burns Supp. 1979). See also E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS
IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 210-17 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BERLSTEIN];
Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes And Their Constitutionality, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1976).
13. See BERLSTEIN, supra note 12, at 215-16.
14. See id. at 208-09; Note, supra note 4, at 881.
15. BERLSTEIN, supra note 12, at 208. The factors employed, individually or in combina-
tion, to determine if the corporation is protected include: 1) incorporation in the state; 2) prin-
cipal place of business in the state; 3) substantial assets located in the state; 4) percentage of the
corporation's total employees located within the state; 5) doing business within the state; 6)
registration of the target company's securities under federal securities laws; and 7) registration of
the securities under state securities laws. Id.
[VOL. 25: p. 458
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companies.1 6  Thus, these laws are extraterritorial in effect; they
apply to tender offers for the shares of a target company regardless of
the locations of the offerors and the offerees.
17
Many state takeover disclosure laws do not define the term "ten-
der offer," 18 choosing instead to base their application upon the per-
centage of the target company's stock sought by the tender offeror.19
The Williams Act also lacks a precise definition, but the SEC has
suggested to the courts eight elements which it considers to be
characteristic of tender offers:
(1) active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for the
shares of an issuer; (2) solicitation made for a substantial percentage
of the issuer's stock; (3) offer to purchase made at a premium over
the prevailing market price; (4) terms of the offer are firm rather
than negotiable; (5) offer contingent on the tender of a fixed
number of shares, often subject to a fixed maximum number to be
purchased; (6) offer open only a limited period of time; (7) offeree
subjected to pressure to sell his stock. . . . [8] whether the public
announcements of a purchasing program concerning the target
company precede or accompany rapid accumulation of large
amounts of the target company's securities.
20
While the tender offeror must own more than five percent of a
class of stock to be subject to the requirements of the Williams Act, 2
1
16. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 7, at 141; Note, supra note 4, at 882. For a table of
state statutes indicating jurisdictional requirements, see BERLSTEIN, supra note 12, at 234-36.
17. BERLSTEIN, supra note 12, at 229. As one group of authors explained: "The vast major-
ity of tender offers involve transactions between persons from a number of different states. The
tender offeror may not be located in the same state as the target corporation, and shareholders
of the target, to whom the offer is made, are often scattered in many states." Id. Regardless of
these multistate relationships, all tender offers to all shareholders, including those domiciled
outside of the state whose statute purports to control, must comply with the regulations im-
posed by that statute. See Note, supra note 4, at 881 n.60. One stated justification for this
extraterritorial effect is that it prevents the offeror from circumventing the requirements of a
particular state's takeover statute by not soliciting shareholders in that state. See Note,
supra note 10, at 515. However, state takeover legislation creates serious impediments
for the tender offeror who must comply with the pre-filing, disclosure, and hearing
requirements of each state whose statute claims jurisdiction over the target company. See
Wilner & Landy, supra note 12, at 21. The conflicting provisions of the various state statutes
may make it difficult to arrange a tender offer and may create an adverse impact on interstate
commerce. See Aranow & Einhorn, supra note 11, at 58-59. For an example of the problems
that arise when two such statutes conflict, see notes 119-32 and accompanying text infra. For a
discussion of the constitutional questions surrounding these extraterritorial effects, see Note,
supra note 4, at 929-39.
18. See Cleveland Bar Ass'n Securities Law Group, State Statutes Regulating Cash Tender
Offers, in TAKEOVERS AND TAKEOUTS- TENDER OFFERS AND GOING PRIVATE 385 (J. Flom,
M. Lipton & E. Steinberger eds. 1976).
19. See BERLSTEIN, supra note 12, at 208; Katcher, supra note 10, at 145.
20. Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). For criticism of the
SEC's reluctance to provide a formal definition by rule, see BERLSTEIN, supra note 12, at 1-2.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976).
1979-1980]
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the requisite percentage in the state takeover statutes varies from five
to twenty percent at the completion of the offer.
22
Recently, these state takeover statutes have come under heavy
constitutional attack with the weight of authority concluding that they
are unconstitutional. 23  In its landmark decision in Great Western
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 24 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit invalidated the Idaho takeover statute as violative of
both the supremacy clause and the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution. 25 Other courts have followed suit in attacking or
invalidating several similar statutes. 26  These decisions have rested
on two bases: 1) the acts are preempted by the Williams Act and,
therefore, violate the supremacy clause; 27 and 2) the acts impose undue
burdens on interstate commerce in violation of the commerce
clause. 28 As will be illustrated below, the Pennsylvania Takeover
Disclosure Law should fare no better than have the others when
tested in the courts.
22. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.57.110(9) (Supp. 1979) (5%); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-
51.5-102(13) (Supp. 1979) (10%); KAN. STAT. § 17-1276 (1974) (20%). See also BERLSTEIN, supra
note 12, at 208.
23. See, e.g., Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), revd
on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (venue
in district court was improper); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,154, at 96,368 (E.D. Va. Sept. 3, 1979) (enjoining enforcement of a
portion of the Virginia Act), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618
F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1980) (court of appeals held that district court, in granting a preliminary
injunction, had not properly allocated the burden of proof, but court of appeals also questioned
the soundness of district court's holding on the merits, stating that this is "not a case of an
entire area which Congress has preempted"); Mite Corp. v. Dixon, No. 79-C-200 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 9, 1979), appeal pending, No. 79-1267 (7th Cir. filed Mar. 14, 1979) (enjoining operation
of the Illinois act on constitutional grounds); Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 3,
12-14 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (invalidating the Delaware and Indiana Acts on constitutional grounds).
Other courts have expressed serious doubts as to the constitutionality of state takeover statutes.
See, e.g., Chromalloy American Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1341, 1347 (E.D.
Mo. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1979) (state acts generally); Daylin,
Inc. v. Varco, Inc., No. 78C-4246 (N.D. I11. Nov. 27, 1978) (Illinois Act); S.G. Sec., Inc. v.
Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1129 (D. Mass. 1978) (Massachusetts Act). Compare Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp. v. Hurd, No. C-2-78-1100 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 1978) (expressing "grave
doubt" as to the Ohio Act's constitutionality) with AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp.
929 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (upholding the Ohio Act).
24. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great Western
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (venue in district court was improper).
25. 577 F.2d at 1274-87. For the text of the supremacy clause, see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2; text accompanying note 46 infra. For the text of the commerce clause, see U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3; text accompanying note 133 infra.
26. See cases cited note 23 supra.
27. See Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1274-81; Dart Indus., Inc. v.
Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 12-13 (S.D. Ind. 1978); notes 46-132 and accompanying text infra.
28. See Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1281-86; Dart Indus., Inc. v.
Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 13-14 (S.D. Ind. 1978); notes 133-88 and accompanying text infra.
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II. THE PENNSYLVANIA TAKEOVER DISCLOSURE LAW
The Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law (Act)29 purports to
have been designed "to provide adequate protection for Pennsylvania
corporations, shareholders, and employees and the public from the use
of takeover offers without full and fair disclosure of information concern-
ing them." 30  Section 74(a) of the Act, the provision containing the
registration requirements, makes it unlawful for an "offeror" 31 to
make a "takeover offer"32 involving a "target company" 33 unless, at
least twenty days prior thereto, the offeror 1) files with the Pennsyl-
vania Securities Commission (Commission) a registration statement
containing certain information specified in section 75; 2) sends copies
of the registration statement to the target company and to the collec-
tive bargaining representative, if any, of the employees of the target
company at its principal place of business; and 3) publicly discloses
the offering price of the proposed offer and the fact that a registration
statement has been filed with the Commission. 34
The Commission is empowered by section 74(c) to require the
offeror to file any other documents that the Commission deems mate-
rial to the takeover offer.3 5  That section also empowers the Commis-
sion summarily to delay the effective date of the offer if it determines
1) that the registration statement does not contain all of the required
information, or 2) that the solicitation materials do not provide full
disclosure to offerees of all material information concerning the of-
fer.
36
Section 74(d) of the Act provides that the tender offer automat-
ically becomes effective twenty days after the date of the filing of tile
required registration statement unless the Commission orders a delay
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
30. Id. § 72.
31. "Offeror" is defined in § 73 of the Act as "a person who makes or participates in any way
in making a takeover offer." Id. § 73.
32. "Takeover offer" is defined in § 73 of the Act as
the acquisition of or offer . . . to acquire any equity security of a target company, pur-
suant to a tender offer, if after the acquisition thereof, the offeror would, directly or
indirectly, be a beneficial owner of more than 5% of any class of the outstanding equity
securities of the target company.
Id. Section 73 goes on to provide for seven exceptions to the above definition. For the exemp-
ted transactions, see id.
33. "Target company" is defined in § 73 of the Act as "an issuer of securities whose equity
securities are or are to be the subject of a takeover offer (i) which is organized under the laws of
this Commonwealth, or (ii) has its principal place of business and substantial assets located in
this Commonwealth." Id.
34. Id. § 74(a).
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or schedules a hearing. 37 A hearing will be held if there is reason to
believe that the offer does not provide the necessary "full and fair" dis-
closure to the offerees of all material information concerning the of-
fer. 3 8  It may be scheduled at the initiative of the Commission or
upon the request of the target company. 39 Once the hearing is
scheduled, it must be held within thirty days of the original filing and
any determination must be made within the thirty days following the
hearing.40
Civil and criminal sanctions are provided for in the Act. 41 The
Commission may issue an order requiring a violator to cease and de-
sist from committing the impropriety42 and, additionally, the Com-
mission may bring a court action "to enjoin the acts or practices and
to force compliance with this act or any regulation or order thereun-
der." 43 The courts, "upon a proper showing" of illegal conduct, may
grant a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order with-
out bond to enforce the provisions of the Act and may also order
rescission of any sales or purchases of securities determined to be
unlawful under the Act. 44 Potential criminal penalties for each will-
ful violation include a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment of
not more than one year, or both. 4
5
III. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE CHALLENGE
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution states in
pertinent part: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." 46  In Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 47 the
Supreme Court summarized the inquiries to be made when determin-
ing whether a statute is void under this clause. The Court stated:
37. id. § 74(d).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 74(e). The 30-day period may be extended by order of the Commission for the
convenience of the parties or for the protection of Pennsylvania offerees. Id.
41. Id. §§ 81(1)-(2), 82(a).
42. Id. § 81(1).
43. Id. § 81(2).
44. ld.
45. Id. § 82(a).
46. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
47. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
[ OL. 25: p. 458
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The first inquiry is whether Congress, pursuant to its power to
regulate commerce, . . .has prohibited state regulation of the par-
ticular aspects of commerce involved in this case. . . .[W]hen Con-
gress has "unmistakably ... ordained" ... that its enactments
alone are to regulate a part of commerce, state laws regulating that
aspect of commerce must fall. This result is compelled whether
Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or
implicitly contained in its structure and purpose ...
Congressional enactments that do not exclude all state legisla-
tion in the same field nevertheless override state laws with which
they conflict. . . .The criterion for determining whether state and
federal laws are so inconsistent that the state law must give way is
firmly established in our decisions. Our task is "to determine
whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, [the
state's] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." . .. This in-
quiry requires us to consider the relationship between state and
federal laws as they are interpreted and applied, not merely as
they are written.
4 8
Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)
49
is the statutory counterpart to the supremacy clause, and is one of the
few indications of congressional intent in this area. It provides:
Nothing in this chapter [which includes the 1934 Act and amend-
ments thereto] shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commis-
sion (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any
State over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict
with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder. 50
In 1917, the Supreme Court recognized a state's right under its
police power to protect its citizens from abuse in securities transac-
tions 5 1 and upheld the constitutionality of the so-called "blue sky"
48. Id. at 525-26, quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
134 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (other citations omitted). There are
three situations in which state statutes have been held to be preempted by federal legislation.
See generally Note, supra note 10, at 517-25. First, state legislation is pre-
empted when Congress clearly has manifested its intent to exclude states from a given
area of regulation. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Napier v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926). Second, state regulation will be invali-
dated where congressional intent to preempt state regulation can be inferred. See Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. at 146-52. Finally, state regulation which conflicts
with federal legislation or impedes the accomplishment of the congressional purposes in enact-
ing the federal legislation will be preempted. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 67.
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
50. Id. § 78bb-(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
51. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917). The Court observed that "[w]e have very
lately decided a case upon the principle of the power of the State to prevent frauds and imposi-
1979-19801 465
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laws on the express ground that each operated only within the bor-
ders of the individual state. 52  When the 1934 Act was passed, 53 state
securities statutes regulating the issuance and sale of securities had
proliferated to the point where they existed in forty-seven states and
Hawaii. 54 Enacted against this background, section 28(a) of the 1934
Act constituted both a recognition of the states' traditional role in the
regulation of intrastate securities transactions and a prohibition
against state regulation conflicting with the 1934 Act-all of this at a
time when there was no federal or state regulation of cash tender
offers. 55
In 1968, Congress adopted the Williams Act,5 6 as an amendment
to the 1934 Act, in response to the increased utilization of the in-
terstate cash tender offer as a corporate acquisition technique. 57 The
Williams Act was designed to enable investors confronted with a cash
tender offer to make an informed decision about whether to tender
their shares. 58 The Senate Report reflected concern about the then-
existing "gap" in the disclosure requirements of the federal securities
tions. . . . The principle applies as well to securities as to material products . . . . Id. at 552
(citation omitted).
52. Id. at 540; Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 559 (1917); Merrick v.
Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 568 (1917). The Court in Geiger-Jones explained that
[t]here is no doubt of the supremacy of the national power over interstate commerce. Its
inaction, it is true, may imply prohibition of state legislation but it may imply permission
of such legislation. In other words, the burden of the legislation, if it be a burden, may
be indirect and valid in the absence of the assertion of the national power ...
The provisions of the law, it will be observed, apply to dispositions of securities
within the State and while information of those issued in other States and foreign coun-
tries is required to be filed . . . . they are only affected by the requirement of a license of
one who deals in them within the State. Upon their transportation into the State there is
no impediment - no regulation of them or interference with them after they get there.
There is the exaction only that he who disposes of them there shall be licensed to do so
and this only that they may not appear in false character and impose an appearance of a
value which they may not possess - and this certainly is only an indirect burden upon
them as objects of interstate commerce, if they may be regarded as such. It is a police
regulation strictly, not affecting them until there is an attempt to make disposition of
them within the State. To give them more immunity than this is to give them more
immunity than more tangible articles are given, they having no exemption from regula-
tions the purpose of which is to prevent fraud or deception. Such regulations affect in-
terstate commerce in them only incidentally.
242 U.S. at 557-58 (emphasis in the original).
53. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78kk (1976)).
54. See I L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 30 (2d ed. 1961).
55. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976).
57. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
58. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1975); Full Disclosure of
Corporate Equity Ownership and Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S.510 Before the Sub-
comm. on Securities of the Senate Comnmn. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 188
(1967).
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laws, 59 but there is no mention in the Senate or House hearings on
the Williams Act of the similar gap in state securities legislation. 60 As
previously noted, at the time the Williams Act was adopted, only
Virginia had enacted a statute to regulate tender offers, and that law
had become effective only a few months prior to the effective date of
the Williams Act. 61 It is not surprising, then, that the Williams Act con-
tains no express preemption provision. However, since the Act was
passed as an amendment to the 1934 Act, it falls within section 28(a)
which makes clear that its integrity is protected against inconsistent
state regulation.
62
In sum, both constitutional and statutory impediments exist to
state tender offer regulations that are inconsistent with the federal
policy for the regulation and administration of cash tender offers ex-
pressed in the Williams Act. As indicated below, the Pennsylvania
Act appears to run afoul of the Federal Act and, thus, "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress." 63
A. The Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law Up-
sets the Careful Balance Struck by Congress in
the Williams Act Which Regulates
Tender Offerors and Target
Management Evenhandedly
The purpose of the Williams Act was to protect investors by re-
quiring disclosure of information relevant to their decision to accept
or decline a tender offer.64 Favoring a market approach, Congress
intended that both the offeror and the incumbent management of a
target company should have an opportunity to present their positions
so that the investor can make an educated and independent judg-
59. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967). See generally Sowards & Mofsky,
Corporate Takeover Bids: Gap in Federal Securities Regulations, 41 ST. JOHNs L. REv. 499,
504-08 (1967).
60. See Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1275 n.39. See also Full Dis-
closure of Corporate Equity Ownership of Securities Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Hearing on H.R. 14475 and S.510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
61. See notes 8-9 and accompanying text supra.
62. See notes 49-50 & 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
63. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. at 525-26, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941).
64. See Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1276-77; S. REP. No. 550,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967). The Senate Report declared that "[tihe bill is designed to re-
quire full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors." Id.
1979-1980]
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ment. 65  Inherent in this scheme is the idea that there must be
"neutrality among the contestants" in a tender offer situation. 66  Rec-
ognizing that tender offers often benefit the investor 6 7 Congress re-
jected the original Senate bill introduced in 1965 which contained
advance disclosure provisions, pre-effective filing requirements, and
other requirements that served to arm target management against
takeover bids. 68  The "deliberate neutrality" of the later bill, from
which such regulations had been excluded, was explained by Senator
Harrison Williams:
The committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance
of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the per-
son making the takeover bid. The bill is designed to require full
and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the same
time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to
fairly present their case.
69
The complete legislative history supports this analysis and presents a
clear congressional commitment to fairness and neutrality. 70
Sections 13 and 14 of the 1934 Act, as amended by the Williams
Act, include "disclosure requirements, substantive restrictions on
tender offers, and a general antifraud provision. [These sections] also
confer . . . broad rule-making authority upon the SEC. "7 1  Section
14(d)(1) requires that anyone who makes a "tender offer" (a stat-
utorily undefined term) which would result in his ownership of
more than five percent of a class of equity securities registered under
the 1934 Act must disclose specified information "at the time copies
of the offer . . . are first published or sent or given to security hold-
ers." 72 Other subsections of section 14(d), the principal provision of
federal tender offer regulation, include: grace periods during which a
shareholder may withdraw securities deposited pursuant to a tender
65. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 7, at 67; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1967). The Senate Report stated that "[tihis bill is designed to make the relevant facts
known so that shareholders have a fair opportunity to make their decision." Id. The Report also
expressed the belief that the bill would provide "the offeror and the management equal oppor-
tunity to fairly present their case." Id.
66. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1277.
67. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967). As the Senate Report indicated: "It
was strongly urged during the hearings that takeover bids should not be discouraged because
they serve a useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched but inefficient management."
Id.
68. See Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1277; E. ARAow & H.
EINHORN, supra note 7, at 66-67.
69. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
70. See Wilner & Landy, supra note 12, at 28-29.
71. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1262 (footnote omitted).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976).
[VOL. 25: p. 458
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offer; 73 requirements that the tender offeror purchase shares ten-
dered during the first ten days of the offer on a pro rata basis if more
shares than the offeror specified have been tendered; 74 and a re-
quirement that any increase in the purchase price in a tender offer be
paid to all tendering shareholders, including those who tendered in
response to a lower price. 75  As one commentator has remarked:
As a whole, . . . section 14(d) can be seen as responding to the
situation prior to the passage of the Williams Act, when a conven-
tional tender offer was capable of pressuring shareholders into ten-
dering hastily, due to the combined effect of a premium price, a
time limit, a specified number of shares to be bought, and a first-
come-first-served purchase policy.
76
Significantly, the Williams Act does not require the offeror to make
any filing or disclosure to either a government agency or the target
company prior to the time the offeror makes the tender offer to the
company's shareholders. Filing and disclosure must be carried out
only at the time the tender offer is made. 77 Thus, the Williams Act
does not give incumbent management advance warning of an incip-
ient tender offer.
In the Kidwell case, one of the grounds upon which the Fifth
Circuit invalidated Idaho's Takeover Disclosure Statute was that, by
requiring advance notice, the statute upset the neutral balance set by
Congress in the Williams Act. 7 8 The court explained:
There is no real dispute that the Idaho statute-like most of the
state takeover laws-increases a target company's ability to defeat
a tender offer. The Idaho law helps target companies primarily
through provisions not found in the Williams Act that give them
advance notice of a tender offer and the ability to delay the com-
mencement of an offer, by means such as insisting on a hearing.
Most observers of takeover battles agree that time is among the
most effective weapons available to a company resisting a tender
offer. The Idaho statute favors the target in other ways, as well. 79
Dismissing what was in "the minds of Idaho legislators" as irrele-
vant, 80 the Fifth Circuit held that the dispositive factor was that
73. Id. § 78n(d)(5).
74. Id. § 78n(d)(6).
75. Id. § 78n(d)(7).
76. Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1250, 1259 (1973) (footnote omitted).
77. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976); note 72 and accompanying text supra.
78. 577 F.2d at 1279-80.
79. Id. at 1278 (footnotes omitted).
80. Id. at 1279.
1979-1980]
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Idaho's legislature chose a "fiduciary approach" 81 to protect investors
rather than the "market approach" chosen by Congress.8 2  Observing
that reliance upon the business judgment of corporate directors as a
means of investor protection was an approach which Congress had
considered and rejected,8 3 the court held that the Idaho statute
"'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives' of the Williams Act."84
Like the Idaho statute invalidated in Kidwell, the Pennsylvania
Takeover Disclosure Law is promanagement and requires disclo-
sures not required by the Williams Act.8 5 The Pennsylvania Act as-
sists incumbent management in resisting takeover attempts in several
ways: 1) it requires the offeror to file a registration statement (and to
send a copy to the target company) at least twenty days prior to mak-
ing a takeover offer; 86 2) it permits the Commission summarily to
delay the effective date of the offer if it determines that the registration
statement is not complete; 87 3) it provides for an automatic delay in
the effective date of a tender offer if the Commission schedules a
hearing (either on its own initiative or at the request of the target
company); 88 4) it enables incumbent management to make arrange-
ments with friendly offerors which would be exempt from the re-
quirements of the Act; 89 and 5) it requires the "unfriendly" offeror to
file a registration statement containing information concerning his
own organization, operations, finances, properties, employee-relations
history, litigation, business, and the like. 90 All of these provisions
serve to strengthen incumbent management's major strategy-
delay. 91 They have the clear effect of "tipping the balance of regula-
tion . . . in favor of management,"92 a situation that Congress was
81. Id. The court characterized the fiduciary approach as one in which reliance is placed
upon the business judgment of corporate directors who owe a fiduciary duty to their sharehold-
ers, rather than upon the business judgment of the shareholders themselves. Id. "Congress
intended for the investor to evaluate a tender offer; Idaho asks the target company management
to make that decision on behalf of the shareholders." Id. See Lynch & Steinberg, The Legiti-
macy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L.Q. 901, 911 (1979).
82. 577 F.2d at 1279.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1280 (footnote omitted), quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
85. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 74-75 (Purdon Supp. 1979); text accompanying note 34
supra.
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 74(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
87. Id. § 74(c).
88. Id. § 74(d).
89. Id. § 78(a).
90. Id. § 75(8).
91. See, e.g., E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 7, at 223; D. AUSTIN & J. FISHMAN,
CORPORATIONS IN CONFLICT: THE TENDER OFFER 127 (1960); Langevoort, State Tender Offer
Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L.Q. 213, 238 (1977);
Wilner & Landy, supra note 12, at 9. See also Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 9
(S.D. Ind. 1978).
92. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
[VOL. 25: p. 458470
13
Tiger: The Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law: A Statute Waiting to Be
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980
TAKEOVER DISCLOSURE LAW
specifically trying to avoid when it enacted the Williams Act.93 The
Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law "upsets the carefully balanced
neutrality of the federal provisions by providing, contrary to the con-
gressional scheme, substantial advantages to incumbent management's
eflbrt to defeat or delay a tender offer."
94
The provisions requiring advance notice that permeate the
Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law, and the ability that those
provisions give to target company management to delay the com-
mencement of an offer by the mechanics of agency approval and pre-
effective hearing procedures, confer overwhelming practical advan-
tages on an unfriendly incumbent management. During the period of
delay occasioned by the operation of the Pennsylvania Takeover Dis-
closure Law, target company management may choose to implement
one or more of the following strategies: 1) repurchase its own se-
curities; 2) induce friendly third parties to make open market pUr-
chases of the target company's securities; 3) announce dividend in-
creases or stock splits; 4) issue additional shares of stock; 5) introduce
possible antitrust considerations; 6) arrange a defensive merger; 7)
enter into restrictive loan agreements; or 8) reincorporate in, or trans-
fer assets to, a state having a restrictive takeover law for the protec-
tion of existing management.9 5 In addition, incumbent management
of the target company can use the delay to further its own self-
interest. It is not infrequently the case in negotiations between a
target company and an offeror that incumbent management seeks job
security or other emoluments in return for its recommendation of the
offer. Such a recommendation creates a "friendly" tender offer and
deprives the Pennsylvania Commission of jurisdiction.
96
Thus, it is evident that the Pennsylvania Act is biased against the
tender offeror and in favor of target management in a manner that
is inconsistent with the federal regulatory scheme. As such the
Pennsylvania Act "'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives' of the Williams Act and
accordingly under the Supremacy Clause is unconstitutional."97
93. See id.
94. Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 12-13 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
95. See id. at 9; E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 7, at 235, 242-68; BERLSTEIN,
supra note 12, at 196-97; Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 81, at 902, 928-38.
96. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 78(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979). If investor protection were
really the primary concern of the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law, the Act would apply
to all tender offers, not only to contested ones. As the accompanying text indicates, it may be
more important to shareholders of a target company that full and fair disclosure be made in the
case of a "friendly" tender offer than in the case of an "unfriendly" offer because in the former
situation, deals may have been struck between management and the offeror of which the
shareholders are unaware. See BERLSTEIN, supra note 12, at 224-27.
97. Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 13 (S.D. Ind. 1978), quoting Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 540-41 (1977).
1979-19801
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B. The Pervasive Federal Regulation of Inter-
state Cash Tender Offers Would Appear to Preempt the
Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law Even
If It Were Not in Direct Conflict with
the Williams Act
Federal law preempts a state statute whenever a scheme of fed-
eral regulation is so pervasive that no room has been left for state law
to provide supplemental regulations. 98 The 1934 Act, as amended by
the Williams Act and as supplemented by the SEC's authority to
pronulgate rules and regulations,99 establishes a comprehensive legis-
lative scheme for the regulation of virtually every aspect of securities
transactions, including purchases and sales pursuant to cash tender
offers. 100 Pursuant to its delegated authority, the SEC has promul-
gated rules and regulations for the implementation of the Williams
Act. 101
The Williams Act and the cases construing it, 10 2 together with
the rules and regulations promulgated by the SEC, 10 3 constitute an
extensive system of federal regulation of interstate cash tender of-
fers. 10 4 In view of the pervasive nature of this regulatory system, it
would seem that any state law that goes beyond the federal regulatory
scheme necessarily interferes with the federal regulation and is,
therefore, invalid. 105
98. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (munici-
pal airport curfew preempted by a pervasive scheme of federal regulation); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (Federal Warehouse Act preempts supplemental state
legislation); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1942) (federal regulation
of production of renovated butter preempts supplemental state regulation).
99. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1), (e) (1976).
100. See notes 71-76 and accompanying text supra.
101. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1979) (describing the information to be furnished to
the SEC by a tender offeror); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l(a) (1979) (describing the information to be
furnished to target company shareholders by the tender offeror); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1979)
(describing the information to be filed with the SEC by a target company offering to buy its
own shares or attempting to persuade its shareholders to either accept or reject a tender offer).
102. See, e.g., Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Strom-
feld v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 484 F. Supp. 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Dart Indus., Inc. v.
Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
103. See note 101 and accompanying text supra.
104. See Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 12 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
105. Several commentators have concluded that the 1934 Act represents a sufficiently "perva-
sive" scheme of federal regulation so as to preempt state takeover acts. See, e.g., Langevoort,
supra note 91, at 246-54; Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 687,
699-700 (1975); Wilner & Landy, supra note 12, at 29-30; Note, Commerce Clause Limitations
Upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1163-70 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Commerce Clause Limitations]. At least one commentator, however, has taken an oppo-
site stance, maintaining that the Williams Act is a "fairly simple minimum disclosure statute"
and is niot a pervasive scheme of regulation of tender offers. Note, supra note 4, at 910-11. This
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Analysis commences with Supreme Court decisions concerning
the preemption issue in regard to other federal regulatory schemes.
In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 10 6 a municipal
airport curfew imposed to reduce local noise was held to be preemp-
ted and, therefore, invalidated by a comprehensive system of federal
control of airport noise involving the Federal Aviation Administration
and the Environmental Protection Agency. 10 7  The federal statute,
the Federal Aviation Act,' 08 did not by its terms preclude local en-
forcement of municipal ordinances against local airport noise; 10 9
nevertheless, the Supreme Court found that "the pervasive nature of
the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise" compelled the con-
clusion that state and local actions were preempted. 110
Similarly, the supremacy clause has been held to forbid efforts
by a state to afford patent protection to that which Congress had de-
termined to maintain free from protection because the state efforts
"disturbed the careful balance" that Congress had drawn."' Where
the federal government has reached a balance that satisfies "the needs
of the subject matter without disproportionate burden on the reg-
ulatees, the balance struck is not to be upset by the imposition of
higher local standards." 112
Since the pervasive nature of the federal regulatory system over
the national securities marketplace-including the regulation of
transactions involving interstate cash tender offers for securities al-
commentator has concluded that, since neither the statutory language nor the legislative history
contains any indication of congressional intent to occupy the field, "reliance on the tradition of
cooperative federal-state securities regulations seems appropriate." Id. at 910. See also Note,
Statutory Comments: Take-over Bids in Virginia, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 323, 334 (1969)
(Williams Act establishes "only minimum requirements, and the state may raise these require-
ments in its own law); Note, supra note 10, at 519-20 (the Williams Act
is not analogous to those federal statutes which have been held to preempt parallel state
legislation). It has been stated that there exists a strong presumption against federal
preemption. See Commerce Clause Limitations, supra, at 1167 n.244, citing Druker v. Sullivan,
334 F. Supp. 861, 862 (D. Mass. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1272 (1st Cir. 1972); Note, The Preemp-
tion Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
623, 639-54 (1975).
106. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
107. Id. at 633, 638.
108. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976).
109. 411 U.S. at 633.
110. Id. See Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 105, at 1162-70. The author of Com-
merce Clause Limitations relied upon the Burbank decision in concluding that the Williams Act
allows no room for supplemental state legislation. Id. But see Securities Law and the Constitu-
tion, supra note 10, at 519-20 n.65 (distinguishing the Federal Aviation Administration regula-
tions involved in Burbank from the Williams Act on the basis of both the comprehensiveness of
the statutory scheme and the lack of a public safety issue in the tender offer context).
111. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 569-70 (1973), quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964).
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ready traded in the national securities markets-is the result of the
balanced nature of its regulation 113 rather than the sheer bulk of
specific regulations, state takeover legislation must be deemed to be
preempted.
C. The Dominant Federal Interest in the
Uniform Regulation of Interstate Cash
Tender Offers Preempts the
Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law
Whenever federal law regulates a field in which the federal in-
terest is clearly dominant over the interests of the states, the federal
system necessarily precludes enforcement of state laws on the same
subject."a 4 Over 100 years ago, the Supreme Court established that
the federal commerce power embraces subjects that "are in their na-
ture national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regula-
tion, [and that] may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require
exclusive legislation by Congress." 115 More recently, this proposi-
tion provided a basis for the Court's decision in Burbank which in-
validated municipal regulation of air travel. 116 The Court deter-
mined that a uniform system of federal regulation is required in order
to fulfill the congressional objectives underlying the Federal Aviation
Act. 1 17 Similarly, control of interstate tender offers would seem to
require a uniform system of national regulation because nonuniform
protection of incumbent management precludes the effective function-
ing of the national securities markets. 118
The need for a uniform system of regulation of tender offers
under federal control is exemplified by a situation encountered
last year by this author. 119 The author represented a Massachusetts
corporation having few, if any, contacts with Pennsylvania, which had
113. See notes 65-70 and accompanying text supra.
114. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 62-65 (1941); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318-19 (1851).
115. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
116. See 441 U.S. at 633; notes 106-10 and accompanying text supra.
117. 411 U.S. at 639.
118. See Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 101-04 (1976) (statement of Richard A. Debs, first vice-
president and chief administrative officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York). See also
id. at 91-94 (statement of Phillip A. Loomis, Jr., SEC Commissioner). Commissioner Loomis
stated that "tender offers are frequently a matter of national concern and the issues they present
call for resolution on a national basis." Id. at 94.
119. Litigation incident to the facts discussed in the text was settled prior to the filing of
pleadings responsive to the target company's complaints. The settlement consisted of a repur-
chase by the target company of its shares from the offeror (the author's client). Accordingly,
none of the issues about to be discussed was ever presented for adjudication.
[VOL. 25: p. 458
17
Tiger: The Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law: A Statute Waiting to Be
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980
1979-1980] TAKEOVER DISCLOSURE LAW
acquired a large number of shares of the common stock of a Pennsyl-
vania corporation whose principal place of business was in Florida.
Standing as obstacles to a takeover attempt by the author's client
were the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law, which purports to
apply to all corporations incorporated in Pennsylvania, 120 and the
now-repealed Florida Investor Protection Act, which purported to en-
compass, inter alia, all corporations having their principal place of
business in Florida.' 2 1 Since the target company was incorporated in
Pennsylvania and had its principal place of business in Florida, the
target company's management claimed, in suits to enjoin the
takeover, that the purported tender offer was subject to regulation
under both takeover statutes.
122
120. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 73 (Purdon Supp. 1979); note 33 supra.
121. See Investor Protection Act, ch. 77-441, §§ 1-8, 1977 Fla. Laws 1804 (repealed 1979).
Section 2 of the Florida Investor Protection Act defined "offeree company" to include any
"corporation having its principal place of business within Florida." Id., ch. 77-441, § 2(7), 1977
Fla. Laws 1805. The Florida statute was repealed effective September 1, 1979. Securities Law,
ch. 79-381, § 13, 1979 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2090 (West).
122. It should be noted that neither the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law nor the
now repealed Florida Investor Protection Act contained any provision authorizing the target
company to bring an action to enjoin takeover attempts allegedly in violation of the state stat-
ute. Cf. UV Indus., Inc. v. Posner, 466 F. Supp. 1251, 1256 (D. Me. 1979) (Maine Takeover
Bid Disclosure Law expressly grants a target company the right to bring an action to enjoin
violations of that Act).
The Pennsylvania Act spells out various causes of action and specifically delineates the
persons who may bring those suits. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 81-83 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
Thus, § 82 of the Pennsylvania Act empowers "the Attorney General ... [to] institute the
appropriate criminal proceedings." Id. § 82. Section 83 grants a cause of action (for rescission or
damages) to any person who sells a security to an offeror who purchases the security in connec-
tion with a takeover offer in violation of the Act. Id. § 83. In addition, § 81 empowers the
Pennsylvania Securities Commission to bring an action to enjoin acts or practices in violation of
the statute. Id. § 82.
Significantly, however, there is nothing in the Pennsylvania Act which purports to grant a
cause of action (either for damages or for injunctive relie) to the target company itself. It is
well-settled that a statute does not grant a private cause of action to every individual who claims
to have been damaged by a violation thereof; a private cause of action arises only when the
statute provides for it, either expressly or by necessary implication. See, e.g., Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 460 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). In Touche Ross, for
example, the Supreme Court held that there is no implied right of action for damages inder §
17(a) of the 1934 Act. 442 U.S. at 576. The Court based its decision on "the plain language" of §
17(a) and on the silence of the legislative history with regard to the existence of a private cause
of action. Id. at 571-72. As additional justification for its holding, the Court noted that "§ 17(a)
is flanked by provisions of the 1934 Act that explicitly grant private causes of action .... [in-
dicating that] when Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy, it knew how to do so
and did so expressly." Id. (citations omitted).
As stated above, the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law grants a cause of action for
injunctive relief to the state regulatory commission, and a private cause of action to aggrieved
shareholders. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 81, 83 (Purdon Supp. 1979). Applying the reasoning of
Touche Ross, these two provisions indicate that when the Pennsylvania Legislature desired to
grant a remedy, it did so expressly. Thus, considering the silence of the Act, it would seem that
the Pennsylvania legislature did not intend to grant a private cause of action to a target coin-
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Although similar in many ways, the Pennsylvania and Florida
takeover disclosure laws differed in several significant respects. Under
section 77(a) of the Pennsylvania Act,' 2 3 an offeree may withdraw
securities deposited or tendered pursuant to a takeover offer at any
time within seven days from the date the offer becomes effective.
124
However, under section 3(3) of the Florida Investor Protection
Act, 125 the offeree could withdraw securities at any time within fif-
teen days after the date of the first invitation to deposit securities.' 2
6
Thus, since both statutes had extraterritorial effect, 127 the careful of-
feror was required to accept the larger withdrawal period provided by
the Florida statute.
A similar conflict between the statutes existed with respect to the
manner in which they dealt with the tender of more shares than the
offeror sought. Under section 77(b) of the Pennsylvania Takeover Dis-
closure Law, 128 if an offeror makes a takeover offer for less than all of
the outstanding securities of a class and the number of shares depos-
ited or tendered within ten days after the offer has become effective
is greater than the number the offeror has offered to accept, the se-
curities tendered within the ten-day period must be accepted pro
rata. 129 While section 3(4) of the former Florida Act contained a
similar provision, the Florida statute did not include a ten-day limita-
tion.' 30 Thus, under Florida law, the offeror had to accept pro rata
all securities tendered (regardless of when they were tendered),
whereas under the Pennsylvania Act the offeror need accept pro rata
only those securities tendered within .the ten-day period.
An example should highlight the problems inherent in this
statutory divergence. Suppose an offeror made a tender offer for 1000
pany under the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law. See Crawford & Schneider, The Implied
Private Cause of Action and the Federal Aviation Act: A Practical Application of Cort v. Ash,
23 VILL. L. REV. 657, 667 (1978) ("where the statute expressly provides a particular remedy, a
presumption against intent to provide other remedies is created"). See also Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 19 ("where a statute expressly pro-
vides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it"); Kroun-
gold v. Triester, 407 F. Supp. 414, 420 (E.D. Pa. 1975), quoting National R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) ("when legislation expressly
provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute
to subsume other remedies").
123. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 77(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
124. Id.
125. Ch. 77-441, §§ 1-8, 1977 Fla. Laws 1804 (repealed 1979).
126. Id. § 3(3), 1977 Fla. Laws 1806 (repealed 1979).
127. Each of the statutes could be applied to tender offers to purchase equity securities of
any corporation within the purview of the statute, regardless of the location of the oflerees. See
notes 17 & 120-22 and accompanying text supra.
128. PA. SrA'r. ANN. tit. 70, § 77(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
129. Id.
130. Investor Protection Act, ch. 77-441, § 3(4), 1977 Fla. Laws 1806 (repealed 1979).
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shares of stock of a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place
of business in Florida and received tenders within the ten-day period
from twenty shareholders, each of whom tendered 100 shares (for a
total of 2000), and received tenders after the ten-day period from
another ten shareholders, each of whom also tendered 100 shares (for
an additional total of 1000 or a grand total of 3000 tendered shares).
Under the Pennsylvania statute, the offeror would be required to ac-
cept 50 of the shares tendered by each of the twenty shareholders
who tendered within the ten-day period, to return 50 shares to each
such shareholder, and to return all 100 shares tendered by each of
the ten shareholders who tendered after the ten-day period had ex-
pired. Under the Florida statute, however, the offeror would have
been required to accept 331/3 of the shares tendered by each of the
thirty shareholders (regardless of when the shares were tendered),
and to return 66 2/3 shares to each of the thirty shareholders. If the
offeror had complied with the Pennsylvania statute, he would have
violated the Florida statute, and if he had complied with the Florida
statute he would have violated the Pennsylvania statute. 131 No of-
feror should be faced with the Hobson's choice of having to violate
one statute in order to comply with another. Such an imposition of
inconsistent duties by overlapping state laws clearly indicates why
this area of law is one which is so national in character that the fed-
eral government has a strong interest in regulating it pursuant to a
uniform, exclusively federal, scheme. 1 32  The Williams Act is this
uniform, federal scheme and, as such, it preempts state takeover
statutes like the Pennsylvania Act. In light of the foregoing, it would
appear very likely that the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law
will be held invalid under the supremacy clause when the issue is
presented for adjudication in an appropriate forum.
IV. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGE
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power "t]o
regulate Commerce ...among the several States."133 As the Fifth
Circuit noted in Kidwell, this affirmative grant of power also "imposes
131. Cf. Wilner & Landy, supra note 12, at 31. Wilner and Landy note that the practical
effect of the variations between the proration provisions of state statutes and that of the Wil-
liams Act "is to pose such burdens and uncertainties as to threaten the validity of any offer." Id.
This analysis is equally applicable to the effect of the conflicting state provisions discussed here.
For another example of overlapping state tender offer statutes which could impose inconsistent
duties, see notes 161-64 and accompanying text infra.
132. See note 48 supra.
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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limits upon state power to regulate commerce over which Congress
has primary responsibility." 134
Thus, states are prohibited from enacting legislation that unduly
burdens interstate commerce. The proper test to determine the valid-
ity of a state statute affecting interstate commerce was set forth by
the Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 135 The Pike Court
stated that "[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate
a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate com-
merce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden im-
posed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the puta-
tive local benefits." 136 The test, therefore, requires a legitimate local
purpose and no more than incidental burdens on interstate com-
merce. Only when both of these requirements are met are we al-
lowed to engage in a balancing of the nature and importance of the
local interests involved against the correlative burdens on interstate
commerce. 1
37
A. The Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law
Does Not Effectuate a Legitimate Local
Public Interest
The Supreme Court has observed that the commerce clause is
more than a grant of congressional power; 138 it also provides constitu-
tional support for the creation and maintenance of interstate markets
where goods and services can be exchanged freely, unimpeded by
state borders or other restraints which might be imposed by parochial
state or local interests.' 3 9  Thus, the commerce clause by its own
134. 577 F.2d at 1281.
135. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
136. Id. at 142, citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443
(1960). See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 (1978); Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976).
137. 397 U.S. at 142. The Court stated:
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the
extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.
Id.
138. See cases cited notes 139-40 infra. It has long been recognized that the commerce clause
is a limitation upon the power of the states. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Ad.
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946); Morgan v.
Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 380 (1946); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
139. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803 (1976); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370 (1976); McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330-31
(1944).
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force has created a federal common market-an area of free trade
among the several states.
140
The area of free trade created by the commerce clause is, by
definition, "free from interference by the States." 141 The commerce
clause erects a constitutional barrier to state regulation of phases of
commerce that are in their nature intensely national-at least where
that regulation substantially impedes the "free flow of commerce from
state to state." 142 In addition, a state's regulation is of doubtful va-
lidity under the commerce clause where it necessarily extends far
beyond the state's boundaries. 143  Since interstate markets for se-
curities are within the area of free trade created by the commerce
clause,' 4 4 state regulation thereof is violative of this constitutional
prohibition.
Despite the Supreme Court's admonition that no state may
"place itself in a position of economic isolation," 145 the Pennsylvania
Takeover Disclosure Law erects a protective economic barrier around
local target corporations by requiring advance notice of proposed ten-
der offers and by providing incumbent management with the means
to delay tender offers. 146 Under section 77(e) of the Pennsylvania
Takeover Disclosure Law, 147 the offeror is prohibited from exercising
any control, directly or indirectly, over any assets of the target com-
pany unless the takeover is made in compliance with the Act.
14 8
These tactical advantages given to incumbent management, together
with a prohibition against relocation of target company assets, clearly
constitute an attempt to regulate interstate commerce in order to pro-
tect local industry and the local economy. Such a burden "has been
declared to be virtually per se illegal."149
140. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comn'u, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977); McLeod v. J.E.
Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1944).
141. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
142. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945), citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
143. See id. at 767 n.2. The Southern Pacific Court noted its fear that "to the extent that the
burden of state regulation falls on interests outside the state, it is unlikely to he alleviated by
the operation of those political restraints normally exerted when interests within the state are
affected.'" Id.
144. See, e.g., Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (New York
statute, imposing higher transfer tax on transfers of securities resulting from out-of-state sales
than on transfers resulting from intrastate sales, held unconstitutional as an undue burden on
interstate commerce).
145. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935).
146. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 74 (Purdon Supp. 1979); notes 31-40 and accompanying
text supra.
147. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 77(e) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
148. Id.
149. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970). In Pike, the Court stated:
[T]he Court has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes requiring business opera-
tions to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed
1979-19801
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Whether a state statute effectuates a legitimate local public in-
terest is a question based upon the substantive and practical effects of
the statute, rather than upon the legislature's declaration of purpose
or the motive that compelled the statute's enactment. 150 Notwith-
standing the legislative pronouncement that the primary purpose of
the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law is the protection of
Pennsylvania corporations, shareholders, and employees, 151 the stat-
ute in fact promotes economic protectionism without any correspond-
ing benefit to target company shareholders residing in Pennsylvania.
This is evident from the provision of the Act exempting any offer that
is recommended to the shareholders by target company management,
despite the fact that disclosure under these circumstances might still
benefit the shareholders. 152 Moreover, the Act's provisions apply re-
gardless of the presence or absence of any Pennsylvania shareholder
and regardless of the presence or absence of a target company's place
of business in Pennsylvania, since mere incorporation in the state is
sufficient to bring the Act into play.' 53  Consequently, the Pennsyl-
vania Securities Commission might be in the position of having to
judge whether or not a tender offer should proceed even though no
stockholder is a resident of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and
elsewhere. Even where the State is pursuing a clearly legitimate local interest, this par-
ticular burden on commerce has been declared to be virtually per se illegal.
Id. See also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-06 (1948); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v.
Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 13 (1928); Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1282
(5th Cir. 1978), revd on other grounds sub non. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443
U.S. 173 (1979). In Kidwell, the Fifth Circuit offered the following analysis regarding the statu-
tory purpose of protecting local business:
It is true that the Idaho law helps incumbent management. One purpose of this favoritism
may be to prevent the removal of local business to other states. This purpose would be
unacceptable. Indeed, statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the home
state that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere impose a burden on commerce
that is per se illegal .... Idaho's law does not require any business to remain in Idaho; at
worst, it hinders relocation. Nevertheless, the purpose of preserving local industry cannot
support the legislation. Nor can that effect be ignored.
577 F.2d at 1282 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
150. See Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928); Lacoste v. Depart-
ment of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545, 550 (1924). The Lacoste Court stated:
This Court will determine for itself what is the necessary operation and effect of a state
law challenged on the ground that it interferes with or burdens interstate commerce. The
name, description or characterization given it by the legislature or the courts of the State
will not necessarily control. Regard must be had to the substance of the measure rather
than its form.
Id. (citations omitted).
151. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 72 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
152. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 78(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979). This section exempts from the
requirements of § 74 "[a]n offer as to which the target company, acting through its board of
directors, recommends acceptance to its shareholders .. . ." ld.
153. See notes 17 & 120 and accompanying text supra; note 33 supra.
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even though the target company conducts little, if any, activities in
Pennsylvania.
Furthermore, the promanagement features of the Pennsylvania
Act actually may have a negative effect on the interests of resident
shareholders of the target company by delaying, and perhaps eventu-
ally defeating, a tender offer made at a premium over the existing
market price. Certainly, a primary interest of an investor is to sell
shares of the target company at the best possible price.
154
In short, as the court in Dart Industries, Inc. v. Conrad155 con-
cluded with respect to the Delaware Act, the Pennsylvania statute
"fails ... to serve any local interest that would justify its impact on
interstate commerce." 156
B. The Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law
Burdens Interstate Commerce
One direct effect of the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law is
that it deters the making of tender offers. As the Fifth Circuit noted
in Kidwell, "state statutes such as [these] have a general effect of
discouraging tender offers."157
The Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law has an inherent ex-
traterritorial effect since it applies to all takeover offers to acquire
shares of Pennsylvania corporations, regardless of where the corpora-
tion's business, assets, employees, and shareholders are located, and
regardless of where the tender offer itself is actually made. 158 This
extraterritorial reach of the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law
necessarily has an impact on interstate commerce' 59 for it will regu-
154. See Langevoort, supra note 91, at 239. Federal courts have been mindful of the con-
gressional intent to protect the rights of shareholders. See Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Com-
prehensive Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842, 845 (2d Cir. 1970). The Butler court stated that
"[wihile courts should rigorously enforce the policy of honesty and fair dealing prescribed by
federal securities legislation, they must guard against the risk that, at the instance of incumbent
management, they may be frustrating informed stockholders from doing what the latter want."
id.
155. 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
156. Id. at 13-14.
157. 577 F.2d at 1283. See also Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. at 10; Langevoort,
supra note 91, at 238. Langevoort points out that
[p]otential offerors facing restrictive laws are discouraged from proceeding with a takeover
bid since losing can be extremely costly in terms of time, effort, and money. Further-
more, the statutes also invite burdensome suits against the offeror. Thus, one can reason-
ably predict that state regulation will discourage offerors from engaging in takeover at-
tempts.
Id. (footnote omitted).
158. See notes 17 & 120 and accompanying text supra; note 33 supra. See also Wilner &
Landy, supra note 12, at 20-21.
159. See Wilner & Landy, supra note 12, at 20-21.
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late disclosures that the offeror makes in other states and will delay
the consummation of those securities transactions until the require-
ments of the Pennsylvania Act are met. Through the extraterritorial
application of the Pennsylvania Act, the Pennsylvania legislature has,
in practical effect, legislated for the entire nation. 160
Still another effect on interstate commerce is created by the in-
consistency among state takeover statutes. Neither the time periods
for administrative clearance nor the definitions of the jurisdictional
bases are consistent. For instance, a tender offer for shares of a Dela-
ware corporation, having its principal place of business in Ohio and
substantial assets in Indiana, might be subject to the takeover statutes
of all three states. 16 1  The hearing requirements of the Ohio1 62 and
Indiana' 63 statutes might collide with the Delaware requirement that
the offer be made not less than twenty nor more than sixty days after
delivery of a statement of intent to make the offer. 164 The direct
conflict between the Pennsylvania Act and the now-repealed Florida
takeover disclosure act in connection with the requirement of pro rata
acceptance of shares tendered in excess of the amount sought has
already been noted. 16
5
Conflicts like these among the state statutes cannot be cured by
deference or cooperation among the various state administrative
agencies. 166 The lack of uniformity among the statutes puts the
prospective offeror at continual risk regardless of his course of action.
A potential player who can never be sure whether he is complying
with the rules may decide that the game is not worth playing at all.
The burden on interstate commerce is clear.
160. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959) (state restriction on
mud guards for trucks and trailers which restricted a vehicle's movement from one state to
another placed unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona,
325 U.S. 761, 773-75 (1945) (state regulation of train lengths which had the practical effect of
regulating length of out-of-state trains imposed unconstitutional burden on interstate com-
merce).
161. ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Subcomm. on Proxy Solicita-
tions and Tender Offers, Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, Report: State Takeover
and the Williams Act, 32 Bus. LAw. 187, 193 (1976). For the takeover or tender offer statutes
of the states mentioned in the text, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1979); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 23-2-3.1-1 to -11 (Burns Supp. 1979); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.04.1 (Page Supp.
1979).
162. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.04.1(B)(1), (4) (Page Supp. 1979).
163. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3.1-7 (Burns Supp. 1979).
164. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1979).
165. See notes 119-32 and accompanying text supra.
166. See, e.g., State Dental Council and Examining Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 269-71, 318
A.2d 910, 914-15 (1974); Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 129-30, 252 A.2d 704, 705-06 (1969);
Carr v. Commonwealth, -_ Pa. Commw. __ , _ 409 A.2d 941, 943 (1980). But
see Note, supra note 4, at 926. The New York University commentator suggests that compliance
with multiple statutes will not be an impossibility because it can be assumed that state adminis-
trators will cooperate with each other and with the offeror. The short answer to this contention
is that one's constitutional rights should not be dependent on the whims of public officials.
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C. The Burdens Imposed on Interstate
Commerce By the Pennsylvania Takeover
Disclosure Law Are Excessive
in Relation to Any Local Benefits
Even if a state statute advances a legitimate state interest, it
nevertheless violates the commerce clause if it burdens interstate
commerce excessively in relation to the local benefit. 167 The balanc-
ing of the national interest in the free flow of commerce against a
legitimate state interest requires an analysis of the nature and extent
of the burdens imposed on interstate commerce by the state statute.
As the Fifth Circuit stated in Kidwell: "IT]he final step under Pike is
to determine whether the legitimate local purposes served by [the]
takeover statute justify the law's substantial impact on interstate
commerce." 168
As was previously indicated, there can be no doubt that trading
in securities involves interstate commerce. 16 9 While it is true that
traditional state blue sky laws have been upheld in the face of com-
merce clause challenges, 170 the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure
Law differs from those laws in that the Pennsylvania Act is not lim-
ited to intrastate transactions and, therefore, is extraterritorial in
effect. 171 In Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 172 the United States Supreme
Court invalidated a New York statute with a similar extraterritorial
reach. 173 The statute in that case prohibited the sale of imported
milk in New York unless the price paid to the producer in the state of
origin was at least equal to the minimum price prescribed in New
167. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1945).
168. 577 F.2d at 1285.
169. See note 144 and accompanying text supra.
170. See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); notes 51-52 and accompanying text
supra.
171. See notes 17 & 120 and accompanying text supra; note 33 supra.
172. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
173. 294 U.S. at 527. For examples of recent cases holding state statutes or regulations hav-
ing extraterritorial reach invalid under the commerce clause because the burdens they isnposed
on interstate commerce were excessive in relation to the local benefits derived, see Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (striking an Oklahoma statute which did not limit the
number of minnows that could be brought into the state or the disposition of minnows within
the state but prohibited transporting any significant number of minnows out of the state for
sale); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (striking a New Jersey statute which
forbade the importation and dumping of most waste originating outside the state); Raymond
Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441-42 (1978) (striking Wisconsin regulations which
limited the length of trucks permitted on the state's highways); Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Ad. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (striking a North Carolina statute which prohibited
Washington apple growers and dealers from displaying Washington apple grades on closed con-
tainers shipped into the state).
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York. 174  Noting that New York could not "project its legislation into
Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in that state for milk
acquired there,"175 the Court held that indirect regulation by one
state of the price to be paid in another state violated the commerce
clause. 176
The Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law asserts even greater
control over conduct outside of Pennsylvania than did the statute in
Baldwin because the Pennsylvania Act can be used to prohibit an
interstate cash tender offer in another state, even though the other
state may have an equal or greater contact with the target company
but may have chosen not to enact any takeover legislation or to enact
takeover legislation of a less restrictive nature. 177 Thus, Pennsyl-
vania seeks to impose its legislative judgment upon other states and
upon shareholders residing in those states. This direct burden on in-
terstate commerce is hardly outweighed by the minimal protection
that the Pennsylvania Act gives to any existing Pennsylvania
shareholders. As previously noted, any advantage to Pennsylvania
shareholders afforded by the Act may be illusory.
178
The Fifth Circuit's analysis of the Idaho takeover statute in Kid-
well is equally applicable to the Pennsylvania Act. While recognizing
the state's interest in protecting investors, the Kidwell court found
that "the strength of this interest is substantially diluted because [the
state] has little reason to protect the large majority of the sharehold-
ers affected by the takeover act."179 In addition, the Kidwell court
maintained that the alleged benefits to investors were uncertain,' 80
and that the shareholders may, in fact, be harmed by the delay that
the statute imposes if, during the delay, the offeror reduces or aban-
dons the offer.
181
The Kidwell court also recognized a state's interest in "encourag-
ing civic responsibility by the management of local corporations," 182
but expressed doubt as to whether such a purpose actually was ad-
vanced by the Idaho takeover statute in light of the law's uniform
174. 294 U.S. at 519.
175. Id. at 521.
176. Id. at 524. The Court stated that "[olne state may not put pressure of that sort upon
others to reform their economic standards. If farmers or manufacturers in Vermont are abandon-
ing farms or factories, or are failing to maintain them properly, the legislature of Vermont and
not that of New York must supply the fitting remedy." Id.
177. See note 153 and accompanying text supra.
178. See 577 F.2d at 1285-86; notes 152 & 154 and accompanying text supra.
179. 577 F.2d at 1285.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1286.
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applicability to all offerors and all incumbent managers.' 83 Even as-
suming arguendo that the additional disclosure would be helpful to
shareholders in determining whether a tender offeror is a responsible
citizen, the Fifth Circuit noted that this "information would be of no
help if it is never disclosed because the burdensome state require-
ments discourage a responsible offeror from ever making an offer for
an Idaho corporation." 184 The Kidwell court suggested that the
state's interest in responsible corporate management could be better
advanced by legislation more appropriate for that purpose.
185
Finally, the Kidwell court balanced the state's interest against the
extensive impact of the statute on interstate commerce. 186 Conclud-
ing that the "burdens [imposed on interstate commerce] are dispro-
portionate to the legitimate benefits the Idaho takeover law pro-
vides," the court held that the Idaho takeover law was invalid under
the commerce clause.1
87
The entire Kidwell analysis is applicable to the Pennsylvania
Takeover Disclosure Law. Like the Idaho statute, the Pennsylvania
Act unduly burdens interstate commerce without providing corres-
ponding legitimate benefits to the shareholders domiciled in the
Commonwealth. To borrow the language of the Dart Industries court:
"In view of the minimal legitimate interests of [the state] here and
the substantial burden imposed on interstate commerce, [the
takeover disclosure act] cannot be sustained under the Commerce
Clause. It is, accordingly, invalid and unenforceable .... .188
183. Id. The Kidwell court remarked:
Surely it cannot be true that all incumbent managers are model corporate citizens or that
all tender offerors are vandals. The record certainly contains no support for such a conclu-
sion. Yet, the Idaho takeover statute imposes the same handicaps on all offerors and the




186. Id. at 1286. See notes 135-37 and accompanying text supra.
187. 577 F.2d at 1286. Under the balancing test announced in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
see notes 135-37 and accompanying text supra, the Idaho statute would have been upheld had it
promoted a legitimate local interest and only "incidentally" burdened interstate commerce. See
397 U.S. at 142. However, in view of the fact that the Idaho statute "halted over 31 million
dollars of interstate commerce," 577 F.2d at 1286, it would appear that the statute was invalid
without having to balance the local interest against the burden on interstate commerce.
188. 462 F. Supp. at 14. The view that state takeover disclosure statutes are invalid under
the commerce clause has been generally supported in scholarly commentary. See, e.g.,
Langevoort, supra note 91, at 242-46; Maylan, supra note 106, at 700-02; Wilner & Landy,
supra note 12, at 15-23; Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 105, at 1152-62.
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V. CONCLUSION
In adopting the Williams Act, Congress struck a careful balance
in order to regulate tender offerors and target management
evenhandedly.' 8 9 This balance is upset by the Pennsylvania
Takeover Disclosure Law which, in effect if not in actual purpose,
gives target management significant advantages over the offeror.' 90
The supremacy clause of the Constitution and section 28(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibit this kind of interference
with the congressionally declared mandate. 191
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law imposes
an undue burden on interstate commerce that cannot stand in light of
the principles that have evolved under the commerce clause. 192 The
Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law does not effectuate a legiti-
mate local public interest and, even if it did, the burdens on in-
terstate commerce that the Act imposes are simply too great for the
statute to be upheld.
193
189. See notes 64-84 and accompanying text supra.
190. See notes 85-97 and accompanying text supra.
191. See generally notes 46-132 and accompanying text supra.
192. See generally notes 133-88 and accompanying text supra.
193. See notes 138-88 and accompanying text supra.
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